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INTRODUCTION 
The truth in this case has been slow to emerge. At every juncture, new facts have been 
discovered and litigated, each time I-evealing more and inore outrageous conduct on the part of 
the judge and prosecutor. Throughout twenty years of post conviction proceedings, Mr. Pizzuto 
has asserted that he was denied a fair and impartial judge and sentencing factfinder. h~ five of the 
six postconvictions filed on his behalt' Mr. Pizzuto has moved for the disqualification of Judge 
Reinhardt on the basis of bias and prejudice, supporting the same with affidavits and specific 
factual allegations. Notwithstanding swoin declarations asserting pre-trial determination of guilt 
and sentence, each Motion to Disqualify has been denied. Every prior postconviction claim 
including ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct has been heard and 
rejected by the very judge who Petitioner claimed was biased. 
In 2005, for the first time, the co-defendant James Rice, upon whose testimony 
Petitioner's conviction and sentence is based in large part and without whose testimony 
Petitioner would not have been "selected" as the person to die for the murders of Del and Be1l.a 
Hemdon, told an investigator working for Petitioner that his testimony was based on a promise of 
twenty years not the threat of fixed life to which he testified. 34845 CR at 31-34. ' 
' The only petition for postconviction relief in which no recusal motion was filed is the 
Ring petition because that case was purely a question of law demanding no fact-finding by the 
sentencing judge. 
Due to the number of proceedings which comprise the underlying record, records cited 
herein will be denoted by the Idaho Supreme Court case number followed by either CR (Clerk's 
Record) or TR (Transcript) and the relevant exhibit or page nurnbers. 
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Because of the questionable credibility of MI-. Rice, Petitioner did not rush into court but 
continued to investigate whether Mr. Rice's assertions might be true. As part of that 
investigation, Mr. Rice's ex-wife was interviewed and corroborated Mr. Rice's statement. Mr. 
Odom, the other predominant &-defendant who testified against Mr. Pizzuto, confirn~ed Mr. 
Rice's statement. Documents found in files which purported to be Mr. Rice's counsel's files also 
corroborated in part the story now told by Mr. Rice. The files also reveal that the deal entered 
into between the state and co-defendants was the result of the trial and sentencing judge's efforts. 
Only after this "deal" was made was the physical evidence suppo~tiing Rice's testimony gathered, 
to be later introduced at trial. That evidence was gathered in part by then-sheriff Randy Baldwin 
at the direction of the judge sougl~t o be disqualified, Judge Reinllardt. 
The district cou~?'s disn~issal under Idaho Code Section 19-2719 neglected the plain 
language and the underlying purpose of the statute to ensure that only a "valid death sentence" is 
expeditiously executed. Idallo Code $ 19-271 9, (emphasis added); see also, State v. Beam, 1 15 
Idatlo 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678, 683 (1988) ("The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute 
stated the need to expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of dilatory 
tactics by those sentenced to death to 'thwart their sentences"' and thus was a legitimate 
government goal for equal protection analysis purposes.) More importantly, the court ignol-ed 
this Court's clear commnitment to avoid manifest injustice notwithstanding the statutory bar. 
Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d 636, 642 (2000)("We must be vigilant against 
imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency."). In Sii~ak this 
Court held that new evidence of previously raised claims may be sufficient to require 
reconsideration of the claim. Here, the evidence that the trial judge and the prosecutor, together 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 2 
and in concert, withheld critical infor~natiort surrou~ldi~lg the benefits promised in exchailge for 
the testimony of the co-defendants resurrects prior claims ofjudicial and prosecutorial 
misconduct' and judicial hias."hese now must arouse even greater constitutional concerns, 
including the subortliftg of perjury by the co-defendants in relation to the plea agreements, and 
judicial misconduct in the ex paile contacts between the sheriff; prosecutor, counsel for co- 
defendauts, witnesses and jurors. The errors must be evaluated in the context of the prior claims 
as well as the claims now raised. The likely prejudice caused by the errors now raised must be 
calculated in light of the cumulative impact of the current and prior claims on the strength or 
wealu~ess of the state's case for guilt or death. See Hovton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 580-8 1(9"' 
Cir. 2005). 
I. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 25, I985 Del and Berta Herr~don were murdered at Ruby Meadows, a remote 
location outside of McCall, Idaho and their bodies buried in shallow graves. The crimes did not 
come to light until July 29, 1985, when Jarnes Rice contacted the police in Orland, California and 
made statements implicating himself, William Odom, Odom's wife, Lene, and Gerald Pizzuto. 
See State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,810 P.2d 680 (1991). 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000)(No. 24802) (Pizzuto I10 including 
trial court proceedings Idaho County Case No: SP-01837. 
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,810 P.2d 680 (1991) (Nos. 16489117534) (Pizzuto I) 
cevt. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992) including the trial court proceedings, Idaho County Nos. 85- 
220751 23001; Pizzuto v. State, 127 ldaho 469,903 P.2d 58 (1995) (No. 21637) (Pizzuto II) 
including the trial court proceedings Idaho County Case No. 23001; Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 
793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000)(No. 24802) (Pizzuto IIq includi~lg trial court proceeditigs Idaho County 
Case No. SP-01837. 
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Autopsies of the Hemdons revealed that both had been struck in the head with a blunt 
object. See State v.  Pizzuto, 810 P.2d 680 at 687. Del Herndon had also been shot in the head 
with a rifle. No murder weapon was discovered nor was ther-e any forellsic evidence linlcirrg any 
of the three men arrested to the crimes. Mr. Rice told the police that the Ilemdons were shot in a 
small cabin but examinatio~ls of tlie cabin by Don J. Phillips and Ned Stuart, State criminalists, 
conducted in August and October of 1985, respectively, did not reveal the presence of any blood 
in the cabin. 34845 CR at 48 and 214-221. 
Eventually Rice, the Odoms, and Pizzuto were arrested and charged in Idaho Cou~zty with 
first degree murder. See State v. Pizzuto, 810 P.2d 680 at 687. All initially entered pleas of not 
guilty. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death 
based primarily on the testimony of Jarnes Rice, William Odom and Lene Odom, each of whom 
ultimately testified and who were given far lighter sentences pursuant to plea agreements with the 
state. 
A. EVENTS LEADING TO JAMES RICE'S GUILTY PLEA 
1. Relevant Background Information 
From the time of their arrests until late January of 1986, none of the persons charged had 
entered guilty pleas or agreed to cooperate with the State. Mr. Rice's status as a co-defendant in 
Mr. Pizzuto's trial, instead of as a witness against Mr. Pizzuto, was especially problematic 
because of the statements Rice had already made. In Rice's initial statement to the police, he 
denied any involvement in the killings. 34845 CR at 50-56. However, after taking a polygraph 
which indicated that he was lying, Rice gave another statement lo the police in California in 
which he admitted to hitting both of the Nerndons in the tread with a hammer, at the direction, 
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not of Mr. Pizzuto, but of Mr. Odom. Id. at 59-60. Mr. Rice gave yet another version of the 
offense when he was interviewed by Idaho County Sheriff Randy Baldwin and attributed primary 
responsibility for the murders to Pizzuto, although admitting it was he who shot Mr. Herndon in 
the head. He claimed he had done so only in an attempt to end Mr. Herndon's sufferings. Id. at 
85-88. No physical evidence co~roborated any of Rice's versions .of events. 
Unbeknownst to Pizzuto's counsel, while awaiting trial in Idaho, Rice continued to give 
conflicting accounts of the crimes to his lawyer. Rice's inability to tell a consisteut story and llis 
generally bizarre behavior aroused such concern with his own attorneys that they moved for a 
mental examination. Id. at 95-97. The attorneys' request was supported by sworn testimony of 
counsel in which they averred Rice answered questions "without any cotu~ection to reality or the 
facts" and was a "compulsive answerer" who could neither tell a consistent story nor assist in his 
defense. Id. at 99-102. Rice was both an admitted polysubstance abuser and convicted felon, 
including an anned robbery conviction. Id. at 104-124. 
In Januaiy of 1986, neither of the Odoms nor Rice had agreed to plead guilty. Without 
cooperation, the prosecutor faced going to trial without any witness who would accuse Pizzuto, 
or any one of the participants, of being the killer. Unbeknow~lst o Pizzuto's trial counsel, the 
active and considerable participation of George Reinhardt, the trial judge in plea negotiations, 
resulted in a plea agreement. In exchange for pleas of gnilty to two counts of second degree 
murder, Rice would testify that he "expect[ed] life in prison" coupled with an off-the-record 
promise that Rice would, subject to his cooperation, be guaranteed a 20-year sentence, which 
with good time credits, would insure that he would actually serve only 14 years, 8 months, and 
I6 days. 111 other words, the jury was led to believe that Rice expected to receive the most severe 
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punishment short of death, while at the same time Rice would be induced to plead guilty and 
testify against Pizzuto secure in the knowledge that awaiting him was a sentence far less than 
life.' 
2. New Facts Supporting Existence of Undisclosed Plea Bargain 
Long after Mr. Pizzuto's conviction was final, Mr. Rice swore under oath that his 
attorneys told him that he would receive a guaranteed ser~tence of20 years in exchange for his 
testimony against Pizzuto and that he would actually serve 14 years, 8 inonths and 16 days. 
34845 CR at 3 1-34. This is, in fact, the sentence that Mr. Rice received. Mr. Rice's ex-wife 
corroborates this testimony and states that Mr. Rice told her prior to his sentencing that he would 
get 20 years. See Id. at 36-39. 
Searching for fiirther coiroboratio~~ of Rice's and his ex-wife's affidavits, Pizzuto's 
counsel procured the files of Mr. Rice's counsel in which notes and billing records of defense 
counsel shed further light on how the deal was reached and then concealed. Id. at 41-46. On 
January 8, 1986 the prosecutor had called Rice's attorney and "discussed certain aspects of the 
Rice case." The followir~g day, Rice's counsel called the prosecutor, Mr. Boomer, and gave him 
"certain information requested the day before." That same day Rice's counsel received a 
Shortly after Mr. Rice pleaded guiity, Mr. Odorn did so as well. He entered pleas of 
guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery, theft, and two counts of voluntary manslaughter with an 
on the record agreement that the prosecutor would not ask for more than 10 years apiece on the 
manslaughter c o u ~ ~ t s  but that the prosecution was otherwise not bound to recommend any 
sentence and the judge not bound to impose any particular sentence. Mr. Odom received a 20 
year sentence-the same as Mr. Rice. 
Petitioner has submitted evidence in a previous post conviction relief petition that Mr. 
Odoln had worked in the past as an informant, that the prosecutor knew he was an informant, but 
that the prosecutor failed to reveal this evidence to the defense and the jury as a result never 
learned that Mr. Odom was an informant. See Pizzuto v. State, 10 P.3d 742 (2000). 
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telephone call from "Judge Reinhardt in reference to the Rice case." On January 13, 1986 Rice's 
counsel's billing records reflect two hours of "serious consultations and negotiations for plea- 
bargaining" with "the prosecutor." Id. at 44. 
The culrnillation of these negotiations was a meeting which took place at the Crossroads 
[a local restaurant] on January 16, 1986. Handwritten notes from one of Mr. Rice's counsel 
show that the meeting took place at 6:00 A.M. and that the attorneys for Rice, the prosecutor, and 
Judge Reinhardt "discussed negotiations for Rice to enter a plea to reduced charges" which 
included "certain questions raised by the judge." Id. at 42. The notes also state that counsel 
"would interview Rice before next Thursday-Jan. 23." Id. at 42. 
Based on the affidavits and counsel notes, Petitioner sought an evidentiary hearing to 
show that it was at this meeting that the prosecutor promised and the judge agreed that if Rice 
pleaded guilty and testified against Pizzuto, he would receive a 20 year sel~tence but only serve 
14 years, 8 months, and 16 days. Id. at 17 and 26. Depositio~ls andlor testimony with the right of 
cross examination of those persons who were present at the Crossroads meetings and its follow- 
up, and are still available to testify, including the prosecutor, now Judge Henry Boomer, and now 
retired Judge Reinhardt, were requested as the only way to determine the extent and result of the 
negotiations in which the judge actively participated. The very fact of the judge's presence is 
enough to raise issue that justice can not seem to be done in this case. 
3. Rice's Guilty Plea 
At Rice's plea hearing the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense misrepresented how the 
agreement had been reached and what the agreement was. The questiolls posed by Judge 
Reinhardt and the answers given by the prosecutor created the impression that the agreement had 
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been reached between the defense and the prosecution by deliberately omitting the judge's 
presence at and participation in the plea bargaining process. 34845 CR at 130-1 34. 1:he judge 
also went to great Lengths to stress to Rice that tl~e court could impose a fixed life sentence for 
each of the second degree murder counts and that Rice was not being promised any sentence, 
when the judge knew full well that he was a party to an agreement that assured Rice a 20 year 
sentence and an even shorter amount of time that would actually be served. Id. at 136- 144. The 
judge specifically asked Rice if any promises had been made in exchange for his guilty plea and 
received an answer of no. Id. at 143. Both the judge and Rice knew that this answer was false 
because a promise of a 20-year sentence had been made -- a promise to which the judge was a 
patty. 
4. The Concealment of the Agreement 
The prosecution delibel-ately concealed the plea negotiations and the promised sentence 
from the defense. On Febtuaiy 18, 1986 the prosecution filed its "Third Conlpliance with 
Discovery" and provided Pimto's  counsel with the transcript of Rice's plea and sworn 
statement. 34845 CR at 126-183. However, the discovety did not mention the negotiations 
between Rice, his counsel, and the judge, and also did not mention that Rice had been promised a 
sentence of 20 years and was not facing a possible fixed life sentence. 
5.  Rice's Testimony at Mr. Pizzuto's Trial 
The knowing concealment by the prosecution and the judge of the benefit Rice would 
receive continued at Pizzuto's trial. The prosecution elicited testimony from Mr. Rice that he was 
facing up to life imprisonment, and emphasized this fact in closi~lg argument. 34845 CR at 19 1. 
While conceding that Mr. Rice had many flaws, the prosecutor was still able to assure the juiy 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRlEF - 8 
that Rice had not gotten away will? anything and was looking at life in prison. "Jim Rice expects, 
and he told you from the witness stand, that he may spend the rest of his natural life in prison. 
Got a great deal, didn't he?" Id. at 194-196. Mr. Pizzuto was convicted of first degree murder 
by a jury that heard false testimony and false argument about Rice's plea bargain. He was then 
sentenced to death by the judge who created a false record of the plea bargain at Rice's plea 
hearing and who knowingly allowed the prosecutor to elicit false testimony froin Rice about the 
plea bargain at Mr. Pizzuto's trial. 
6. Rice's Sentence 
The day after Mr. Pizzuto was sentenced to death by Judge Reinhardt, Judge Reinl~ardt 
gave Mr. Rice his promised reward by sentencing him to 20 years on each of the second degree 
murder counts with such sentences to run concurrently. This was the same sentence received 
by William Odom, who had entered pleas of guilty to the lesser charges of conspiracy to commit 
robbery and voluntary manslaughter and who had a less serious prior criminal history than Mr. 
Rice. 
B. THE BLOOD EVIDENCE 
During the same time span that the prosecution and the judge were inducing Rice to plead 
guilty with the promise of a 20-year sentence, the blood evidence in the case undenvent a 
dramatic transformation. 
The defense wanted its own crirninalist, Ann Bradley, to examine the cabin. Ms. Bradley 
worlced for the state crime lab and indicated that it would he difficult to perform an examination 
in the winter in a cold cabin, and the defense was therefore proposing to continue the trial to 
aIIow for an examir~ation in wanner weather. Dnring the week of January 6th, Randy Baldwin, 
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the slleriffof Idaho County, and a close confidante of Judge Reitlbardt, was contacted by the 
judge regarding heating the "suspect cabin" to avoid the need for such a contin~ance.~ 34845 
CR at 198. On January 13, 1986, following another conversation with Judge Reinhaudt, Sheriff 
Baldwin and Deputy Travis Breckon went into the cabin "where the murders of the Herndans 
took place" and "set up two large propane heaters for the purpose of melting the snow off of the 
cabin and warming up the cabin so that criminalists could process the scene." Id. at 199. Sheriff 
Baldwin claimed he noticed "an empty 22 caliber casing on a log that was near the door." Id. 
When the police examined the cabin on July 29, 1985, they did not see. ally blood in the 
cabin. Id. at 205. Because the police who looked in the cabin knew that Mr. Rice was claiming 
that he saw the bodies of the Iiemdons wrapped in tarps inside the cabin they specifically 
examined the cabin for blood traces. Id. at 212. On A u g ~ ~ s t  7, 1985, Don J .  Phillips, a state 
criminalist, examined the cabins for blood and could not locate any blood traces. Id. at 21 5-219. 
When Ned Stuart, the state's criminalist, had examined the cabin on October 24, 1985, he 
did not observe any blood at the cabin. Id. at 48. By the time Stuart's second examination of the 
cabin took piace, intensive negotiations for Mr. Rice to plead ~ i l t y  were underway. Id. at 41-46 
and 223-224. As indicated by Mr. Rice's statement at his guilty plea, he was now recou~lting a 
story in which Mr. Pizzuto killed the Herndons in the cabin and in which Rice hiinself shot Mr. 
Hemdon in the cabin. Without any blood in the cabin, the truth of this story would be thrown 
into grave doubt. 
Contact between the judge and sheriff was common. See Declaration of Travis 
Breckon. Id. at 201-203. 
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It is against this background that Ann Bradley's observations must be assessed. When 
Ms. Bradley examined the cabin the day nfev Sheriff Baldwin and Deputy Breckon had been in 
the cabin by themselves, she immediately obsel-ved blood with her naked eye and discovered 
other blood using Lukophenothalein testing. Ned Stuart, the state's expert, who had 
aceo~npanied Ms. Bradley for the testing, also observed blood on the walls of the cabin and at the 
base of the cabin. Id. at 228. Mr. Stuart submitted a report on January 29, 1986 detailing his 
observations at the cabin and noting that "[t]he results of this examination indicate the presence 
of blood in the area of the north-east corner of the cabin. This is consistant [sic] with the 
statements of Rice." Id. at 223-224. At trial the prosecution contended that finding the blood in 
the cabin meant that Mr. Rice's account should be believed. Id. at 262-263. 
The State's evidence regarding blood on the defendants' clothing also changed in 
response to the findings of the "defense" criminalist. Ned Stuart, the state's expert, testified that 
he had found blood on clothing belonging to Rice, Odom and Pizzuto, although he was unable to 
determine whelher the blood was human. Id. at 255. Ann Bradley testified that when she 
examined the clothing she found possible blood on only three items of clothing, including a shirt 
allegedly belonging to Mr. Pizzuto, but which the State's witness, Angellina Rawson, asserted 
belonged to Mr. Pizzuto's father, Id. at 293-294, and a pair ofblue jeans belonging to Mr. Rice. 
She was unable to determine whether any of these items contained human blood. Id. at 266-270. 
She found no blood on a blue nylon jacket allegedly belonging to Mr. Pizzuto. Id. at 269. These 
observations were in stark contrast to those of Mr. Stuart. Id. at 272. 
Mr. Stuart did not make any report on his blood examinations until January 22, 1986, the 
day before Mr. Rice entered his plea of guilty. Id. at 42-46, 128-183, and 272. His initial report 
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did not mention any tests on the blue nylon windbreaker. Id. at 48. It was only in a report a 
week Later that Mr. Stuart. claimed to have found blood on the wirmdbreaker. Id. at 272. No 
exptatlatior~ appears as to w11y the blood testing was not reported at an earlier date. 
Mr. Stuart provided a memo to the prosecutor on January 22, 1986 in which he attributed 
his failure to detect blood on October 24, 1985 to the cabin not being dark enough to pennit 
effective use of the luminol test he employed and to the walls being too wet and possibly 
masking visible blood. Id. at 48. At trial Mr. Stuart repeated this explanation and stated that he 
had suggested that a return trip occur to allow for testing under proper conditions. Id. at 227. At 
trial Mr. Stuart never explained why such a tlip did not happen until the defense asked to 
investigate further. 
[I. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL 
Judgment and sentence were imposed by District Judge George Reinhardt, Second 
Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of idaho, Grangeville, Idaho on May 27, 1986. Stale of 
Idaho ~i Gerald Ross Pizzuto Jr., idaho County Case No. CR 85-22075. The convictions and 
sentences imposed for which relief is sought are two sentences of death for two counts of murder 
in the first degree. 
The jury in petitioner's case returned verdicts of guilty on two counts of murder in the 
first degree and two counts of first degree felony murder. 16489 CR at 994, 997, 1000, 1010. 
The amended complaint under which petitioner was tried did not allege ally aggravating 
circumsta~lces making petitioner eligible for the death penalty and no aggravating circumstances 
were submitted to the jury. Id. at 16- 19. 
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8. DIRECT APPEAL 
Petitioner, represented by trial counsel, appealed to the Idaho Supreme Cou~t  from the 
Judgment and Conviction, the imposition of senteuce, and the denial of postconviction relief. 
The conviction and sentence of death were affi~med. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 747, 8 10 P.2d 
680 (1991), cert. denied, March 2, 1992. In that appeal he specifically raised the issue of Judge 
Rei~thardt's bias and prejudice. Id. at 776, and at 714. 
C. STATE POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
Following the denial of his appeal and initial petition for postcollviction relief, Petitioner 
was appointed new counsel in federal coult. New counsel filed a petition for postco~iviction 
relief in state court, prilnarily assertiltg that Mr. Pizzuto had been denied effective assistance of 
counsel. 21637 CR at 1-29. The sulnma~y dismissal of the petition was affirmed. Petitioner 
sought to disqualify Judge Reinhardt, (Id. at 27 and 34), after the denial of which was 
acknowledged as evror by this Court. Pizzu~o v. State, 127 Idaho 469,471,903 P.2d 58,60 
(1995). 
While Petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition was pending, Petitioner discovered 
significant impeachment evidence regarding co-defendants James Rice and William Odom which 
had been available to the prosecutor and sentencing judge prior to Mr. Pizzuto's trial and 
sentencing but was not disclosed to Petitioner. Idaho County Case No. SP-1837, Idaho Supreme 
Court No. 24802. Judge Reinhxdt denied a Motion to Disqualify him from presiding and 
summarily dismissed the petition under Idaho Code § 19-2719 sirtlultaneously. 24802 CR at 193- 
206. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner raised on appeal the denial or dismissal 
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of the Brady claim and the denial of the Motion. Pizzuto v. State, 134 ldaho 793, 195, 10 P.3d 
742,744 (2000). 
Petitioner has currently pending a Petition for Postconviction Relief Appeal on remand 
&om the United States Supreme Court in light of the holding in Danfouth. IJ.  Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 
1029 (2008). See Rhoades et. al, v. Idaho, ldaho Supreme Court Consolidated Case No. 35 187. 
Said appeal arises from the denial ofjury factfinding at sentencing in violation of the principles 
of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
Petitioner also filed a Petition for Postconvictio~~ Relief in which he asserted, with 
supportirrg documentation, that he is melltally retarded and the Eighth Amendment precludes his 
execution pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) in which he sought to disqualify 
Judge Reinhardt, a motion which was denied by Judge Reinhardt. 32679 CR at 122-128 and 
193-194. The Petition was summariiy dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal on the lack 
of aprima facie case. Pizzzrto v. State, Idaho County Case No. CV-03-34748, filed June 19, 
2003. Judge George Reinhardt, Ret. Dist., presiding. Pizzuto v. Sfate, 2008 WL 466568 (Idaho 
2008). 
D. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
Once new counsel was appointed, Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief. The 
United States District Court denied relief and Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Pizzuto v. Arave, CV 92-0241-S-AAM. The Ninth Cil-cuit Coult of Appeals affirmed 
the denial of relief. Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949 (9Ih Cir. 2002). Following the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Schviro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (20041, Petitioner timely filed a 
Petition for Rehearing which was denied. The mandate was stayed pending resolution of 
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Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari which was denied on October 3 1,2005 by the IJnited 
States Suprernc Court. 34845 CR a1 29. The question raised, however, is now before this Court. 
See Rlzoades et al, v. Idaho, Idaho Supreme Court Consolidated Case No. 35 187. Also pending 
in the United States District Court is a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting 
Petitioner caluiot be executed because he is mentally retarded. Pizzuto 11. Hardison, CV-05- 
00516-S-BLW. 
E. THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS 
This case has been pending since November 25, 2005 and was from the start "a hot 
potato" tossed from judge to judge. The matter was initially assigned to Judge Bradbuy of the 
Second Judicial District. 'The State filed a Motion for Automatic Disqualification. The 
Administrative Judge of the Second Judicial District advised the Supreme Court that the entire 
bench in the Second Judicial District voluntarily recused itself as a result of the allegations of 
judicial misconduct against Judge Reinhardt, a senior judge in the district. This Court assigned 
the case to the Fourth Judicial District and the case was then assigned to Judge Darla 
Williamson. 
On April 6,2006, there was a scheduling conference in which the Court, in an effort to 
expedite proceedings, set both a briefing schedule on the state's motion for summary dismissal 
and a tentative date for an evidentiary hearing should the court deny the summary dismissal 
motion. 34845 CR at 359. On May 25,2006, Judge Williamson heard oral argument on the 
State's motion for summary dismissal. Id. at 488-459. On June 1, 2006, Judge Williamson 
issued an opinion, the specific holdings which Petitioner now appeals includes: 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 15 
Disniissal of the Claim relating to "The Blood Evidence" as "categorically 
cumulative and/or irrelevant." 34845 CR at 502. 
The Dismissal ofthe Claims relating to the Recently Disclosed Plea Bargain 
because "the plea bargain evidence is not material under the standards set forth in 
Napue, Hayes, and Sivak. " Id. at 5 10. 
The Dismissal of tile Judicial Misconduct Claims regarding Judge Reinhardt's 
participation in and his silence when perjury was comtnitted and his interaction 
with the jurors during the trial and after the verdict was rendered. Id. at 51 1. and 
520. 
The denial of the right to depose Judge Reinhardt and the denial of the request to 
depose prosecutor Henry Boomer and Randy Baldwin, limiting the same to four 
(4) interrogatories each. Id. at 5 16. 
The Court's Order denying in part Petitioner's Motion to File Additional 
Affidavits and granting in part Respondent's Motion to Strike the following: S I0 
of Affidavit of James Brill, Petition Appendix 2-2, and in their entirety 
Appendices Z-6,2-7,2-8,Z-10,2-12,Z-15, and the Affidavit of Ronald D. 
Howen. Id. at 517-51 8. 
The Court granted tlle State's motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2719. The Court did, 
however, deny in part sulnmary dismissal in respect to Mr. Pizzuto's claim of judicial bias and 
misconduct regarding Judge George Reinhardt and ordered an evidentiary hearing on that issue 
on the previously scheduled date of June 26,2006. Id. at 5 10-5 13. Orders granting very limited 
discovery and granting in part and denying part Respondent's Motion to Strike were also entered. 
Id. at 515-520, 538. Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Expand the 
Scope of the Evidentiary Hearing, which was denied. Id. at 561-566. The State did not move for 
reconsideration hut prepared for the evideritiary hearing. Seegenerally 34845 CR. Petitioner 
subpoenaed Judge George R. Reinhardt to the hearing. Counsel for Judge Reinhardt filed a 
motion to quash the subpoena, which was rendered moot by Judge Willia~nson's recusal and 
Judge Owens' reconsideration of her June l ,  2006 Order. 34845 CR at 583 and 637. 
On June 22,2006, counsel Robert Combiner traveled to Eugene, Oregon to attend a 
deposition of Earl Davis ordered by Judge Williamson at the insistence of the State because Mr. 
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Davis could not leave his dog unatte~tded to testify at the hearing. Just before the deposition was 
scheduled to begin, Judge Willianison conducted a telephonic hearing on petitioner's motion to 
quash the deposition. At the conclusion of this hearing, Judge Willian~son recused herself. 
The matter was then assigned to fIon. Deborah Bail, and little or no action was taken for 
thirteen (13) months. 34845 CR at 601-622. The State filed a motion for reconsideration of 
Judge Willia~nson's decision granting a hearing on petitioner's claim ofjudicial misconduct. 
The motion came seven weeks after Judge Williamson's decision and almost a month after Judge 
Williamson recused herself. Judge Bail simply reassigned the matter to Hon. Patrick Owen 
without notice to the pal-ties. 34845 CR at 625. 
A&er supple~nental briefing and argument, Judge Owen, without addressing Judge 
Williamson's Order, granted the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of the judicial 
misconduct issue upon which Judge Williamson had granted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 637- 
648. 
The Courl below took judicial notice of all of the prior proceedings related to the 
conviction and seutence including but not limited to: State v. Pizzuto, Idaho County Case NO. 
22075; Pizzuto 12. State, Idaho Coluity No. 23001[Consolidated PCR]; Pizzuto v. State, Idaho 
County Case No. SP-00961 and 23001 [LAC PCR]; Pizzuto v. State, Idaho County Case No. SP- 
1837 [First Bvady PCR]; Pizzuto v. State, Idaho County Case.No. 02-33907 [Ring PCR] (appeal 
pending); Pizzuto v. State, Idaho County Case No. CV03-34748 [Atkins PCR]. 
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111. ARGUMENT 
A. MK. PlZZUTO WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENIED AN 
IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND SENTENCER 
1. The Constitutional Guarantee of an Irnpartiaf Judge 
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see also, Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The 
entitlement to an impartial tribunal applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding as 
well as to the guilt phase. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,518 (1968). Due process 
demands more than that the sentencer actually be impartial; rather, " 'justice anus1 satisfy the 
appearance ofjustice.' " In re M~irchison, 349 U.S. at 136, quoting Oflutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 1 I, 14 (1954); see also, In re Murchison, 349 US., at 136 ("[OJur system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness"); Mayberry v. Pennsyl~jania, 400 U.S. 
455,469 (197 1) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe appearance of even handed justice ... is at the 
core of  due process"). The evidence that Judge Reinhardt may have brought to bear on his 
decision a personal a~~ilnosity, a personal agenda, an adversarial mindset andlor specific 
information about Pizzuto not presented as evider~ce in the capital sentencing proceeding is too 
great in this case to satis@ the demands of the Due Process Clause. See In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. at 136 ("Sucll a stringent rule [nay sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias 
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending 
parties"). 
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits consideration during the sentencing 
phase of cvidence that the defendant has not had an opportunity to rebut. Consequently, in 
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Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,358 (1977) (plurality opinion), the Court rejected as 
unconstitutiotlal a "capital-sentencing procedure which pem~its a trial judge to impose the death 
sentence on the basis of confidential information which is not disclosed to tlze defendant or his 
counsel." In light of the stark finality of the death sentence, the importauce of procedural 
safeguards in capital sentencing proceedings cannot be overstated. "Because sentences of death 
are 'qualitatively different' from prison sentences, this Court has gone to extraordinary measures 
to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as 
much as is humallly possible, that tlze sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, 
or mistake." Eddings v. Olclahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117- 118 (1982) (citation omitted) (O'Connor, 
J., concu~ring), see also, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,492-493 (1990); Cal(fornia v. Ramos, 
463 U.S. 992 (1983). 
Generally, a petitioner challenging his conviction or sentence 011 due process grounds, 
based on the trial judge's alleged bias, must demonstrate that the judge was actually biased or 
prejudiced against the petitioner. See Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 F.2d 993,996-97 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 982 (1983); Corbett 11. Bordenlctrcher, 615 F.2d 722,723-24 (6th Cir. 1980); 
Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 852-53 (10th Cir. 1979); compare Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 
(1982) (petitioner alleging juror bias must prove actual bias to establish due process claim). As 
the Supreme Court has recognized, "[nlot only is a biased decisiomnaker constitutionally 
unacceptable but 'our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of 
unfairness.' " Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47 (1979, quoting i n  re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 
136. The Court recognizes that in some circumstances, "the probability of actual prejudice on 
the part oftlte judge or decisionmaker [may be] too high to be constitutionally tolerable." 
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Withvow, 421 U.S. at 47. The test in determining the propriety of a presumption ofjudicial bias 
is whether, "realistically considering psycl~ological tendencies and hurnan weaknesses, the judge 
would be unable to hold the proper balance between the state and the accused." Dyas v. 
Lockhart, 705 F.2d at 996-97, citing, Tumey ,I. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,532; Withmu v. Larkin, 421 
U.S. at 47; Taylov v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,501 (1974). 
Among those procedures that are fundamental to our adversary system is the use of an 
independent prosecutor to pursue charges against a criminal defendant. It is axiomatic that the 
prosecution of crimes is not a proper exercise of the judicial hnction. See, e.g. In re Muvchison, 
349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955); Unitedstates v, Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (SthCir.), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 935 (1965); see also, Bagwell, 551 U.S. at 840 (Scalia, J., concuning) (noting that the idea 
"[tlhat one and the same person should be able to make the rule, to adjudicate its violation, and 
to assess its penalty is out of accord with our usual notions of fairness and separation of 
powers"); Young, 48 1 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, I., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing that the 
judicial power "does not include the power to seek out law violators in order to punish them - 
which would be quite incompatible with the task of neutral adjudication"). 
The broad sentencing powers and responsibility o f a  trial judge cannot permit a judge to 
dispense with a prosecutor altogether and fill the role himself, any more than the inherent powers 
of contempt permit the trial judge to abandon his judicial role in favor of a prosecutorial one. 
See In re Murchisorz, 349 U.S. at 136-39 (holding that the judge violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment when he initiated, prosecuted, and adjudicated indirect criminal 
contempt charges); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass 'n, 968 F.2d 523, 53 1 (5th Cir. 
1992) (holding that the district court erred when it "sua sponte initiated the contempt proceeding, 
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questioned the witnesses and otherwise acted as prosecutor, and then decided aIi factual and legal 
issues"); In re Davidson, 908 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court 
comtliitted reversible error when it prosecuted and adjudicated criminal contempt charges); see 
also, United States v. GriTfin, 84 F.3d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the "crucial 
determinant" of whether appropriate procedural protections have been afforded in a criminal 
contempt proceeding is "the extent of the judge's intrusion" into the authority of the executive 
branch to prosecute crimes). 
"Among the cardinal principles of our Anglo-American system of justice is the riotion 
that the legal parameters of a given dispute are framed by the positions advanced by the 
adversaries, and may not be expanded sua sponte by the trial court." Doubleday & Company, 
Inc. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495,502 (2d Cir. 1985). It contravenes widely accepted norms as to the 
proper role of courts to have the judge act as adversary, and uncover evidence to support and 
bolster a sentence of death when the prosecutor fails to do so. 
2. Facts Supporting the Judicial Misconduct Claim 
The unrefuted allegations that Judge Reinhardt expressed hostility toward Mr. Pizzuto, 
directed and orchestrated the plea negotiation and blood evidence investigation, and decided to 
impose the death penalty in advance of the sentencing hearing, compel the conclusion that Mr. 
Pizzuto was not tried by an i~npartial judge, in violation of due process. The allegations, if 
proved at an evidentiary hearing, entitle Mr. Pizzuto to a new trial. Porter v. Singletavy, 49 F.3d 
1483, 1489-90 (1 1th Cir. 1995). The district court erred in finding this claim proceduraliy 
barred, Mr. Pizzuto is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the critical issue of judicial 
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rlziscor~duct, i.e., did Judge Reinhardt in fact pre-judge both the guilt of Petitioner and the 
appropriate penalty to impose. 
It is respecthlly submitted that the evidence before this Court is overwhelmingly 
affirmative on that issue. Judge Reinhardt participated and orchestrated an arrangement to assure 
the State had a witness to testify that Mr. Pizzuto was the killer; Judge Reinhardt repeatedly 
advised the family of Petitioner, both those who were in contact witti Petitioner and those who 
were testifying for the State and estranged kom Petitioner (Angelina Rawson) of his intent to 
impose the death penalty in words not unlike those he used in the Lan/$ooud case as testified to by 
the Court reporter, Gloria McDougall. 34845 CR Exh. 26. His pre-judgment as to penalty is 
confinned by his co~lversations with the jury following the verdict. 34845 CR at 274-277,279- 
382 and 287-289. Judge Reinhardt participated in Pizzuto's trial, sentence and postcoilvictiou 
proceedings without giving notice to Petitioner's counsel of his activities in relation to the plea 
negotiations and the acquisition of blood evidence prior to Mr. Pizzuto's trial. 111 what would 
have been perjurious for a witness, the judge's silence during Mr. Pizzuto's trial regarding his 
pre-trial actions is unquestionably uncon~titutional.~ Neither the Constitution of the United 
States of America, nor of the State of Idaho can possibly permit an execution ordered by a judge 
so decidedly partial. U.S. Const. 5, 8, 14; Idaho Const., Art. 1, $56, 13. 
Judge Reinhardt's silence has previously resulted in constitutional error. See Lanlcfooud 
v. Idaho, 500 Idaho 1 10, 120 (1991). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF- 22 
3. Petitioner Has Been Cor~sistently Diligent in Pursuing H i s  Judicial 
Misconduct Claim 
In prior postconvictions, Mr. Pizzuto has raised claims of judicial misconduct, offering 
affidavits to support the same. Petitioner has alleged and the State has not refueed that Judge 
Reinhardt had made cornmelits suggesting he was going to "bum" Petitioner's "ass", and that his 
attorney Nick Chenoweth was a close personal friend of Judge Reinhardt.' 2 1637 CR at 1-27; 
24802 CR at 176-184; 34845 CR at 643. Mr. Pizzuto also moved to disqualify Judge Reinliardt 
and requested discovery and art evidentiary hearing. 2 1637 CR at 27. Judge Reinhardt dismissed 
the petition witliout ruling on the disqualification motiotr. This Court affirmed, holding that all 
of the issues, including those relating to judicial misconduct, should have been raised in Mr. 
Pizzuto's first post-conviction proceeding. Pizzuto 11, 903 P.2d at 60. 
In the federal courts, Petitioner again raised the issue ofjudicial misconduct. See Pizzuto 
v. Avave, USDC CaseNo. CV-92-0241-S-AAM, specification of non-frivolous issues to be 
raised in Petition for Habeas Colpus, (Dkt. 4), and First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, Dlct. 29. The federal district court refused to reach the rnerits of the claim. 
Achrowledging that Mr. Pizzuto had provided affidavits substantiating Judge Reilrhardt's off- 
the-record remarks, the district col~rt nevertheless found that because Mr. Pizzuto had not 
explained how the hostile remarks to his family members had affected the trial, he could not 
Petitioner has also alleged without refutation that Mr. Chenoweth did not inform Mr. 
Pizzuto that Idaho law allowed for a prelnptory disqualification of the trial judge. Mr. 
Chelroweth knew that Judge Reinhardt had sentenced Bryan Lankford to death the previous year 
where the State had not even asked for the death penalty. Lnn.kfol,d v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 
(1991) (reversing death penalty because of lack of notice to defense). 21637 CR at 5-6. 
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show "&prejudice." See Pizzu~o I). Arave, USDC Case No. CV-92-0241-S-AAM, Order 
Resolvillg Procedural Issues, Dkt. 78 at 77-80. (einphasis in original). On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that Petitioner failed to establish "cause" to avoid the finding of 
procedural default in the state courts. Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 1;. 3d 949,975 (9'h Cir. 2002). The 
additional evidence now adduced showing extraordinary bias and misconduct on the part ofthe 
trial and sentencing judge compels reconsideration of the issue and reversal of the co~~viction a d 
sentence imposed by that judge. 
B. PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, EIGHTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE ACTIONS 
OF THE PROSECUTOR 
Under Brudy, "suppressiou by ihe prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maoiland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87 (1963). To prevail on a Brady claim, "[tlhe evidence at issue must be favorable to the 
accused, either because it is exculpatoly, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have 
been suppressed by the State, either dillfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." 
Bunk v. Dvetke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prejudice occurs 
if the evidence is "material." Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980,985 (9th Cir. 2005). "Evidence is 
material if there is a reasonable probability that, had it bcen disclosed to the defense, the outcome 
of the trial would have been different." Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 11 13 (2005), 
overruled on othev grounds, Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006). A "reasonable probability" 
of a different result exists "when the government's cvidentiary suppression 'undermines 
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confidence in the outcome of the trial.' " Kyles v. Whilley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995) (quoting 
United States v. Bagley, 473 lJ.S. 667, 678 (1985)). 
In evaluating materiality, however, the question is "not whether the defendant would 
Inore likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence," and "is rrot just a matter 
of detem~ining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in Light of the undisclosed 
evidence, the re~naini~lg evidence is sufficie~lt o support the jury's conclusions." Stuiclcler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263,289-90, (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the hcus is 
on the confidence in the verdict. Id. 111 making this determination, this Court must consider 
Brady violations curnnlatively. See Kyles, 5 14 U.S. at 436-37. The lower courts did not consider 
the impact of the prior Bvady violations raised and accepted by this Court together with the 
violatio~ls now raised. At a minimum, the mattel- must be reversed for consideration of 
materiality and prejudice in the aggregate. 
The ttlree components or essential elements o fa  f3uady prosecuto~ial misco~lduct claim 
are ( I )  favorable evidence, (2) that is withheld by the prosecution, and (3) that results in 
prejudice. The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching. The materiality standard for Brady claims is met when 
the favorable evidence wuld reaso~tably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as 
to undermine confidence in the verdict. Banlcr v. Dretlce, 540 U.S. 668,698 (2004) (quotations 
omitted). 
Favorable evidence is material, and its suppression is unconstitutional, "if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
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proceeding would have been different." United States, v. Ba'gley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985). 
Reasonable probability "is a probability sufficient to undel~nine confiderlce in the outcome." Id. 
Materiality "must be exraiuated in the context of the entire record." United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 112 (1976). The mere possibility that undisclosed infornlation might have helped the 
defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, is insufficient to establish materiality in 
the constitutional sense. Id. at 109-10. Additionally, in order to be material infonnation within 
the meaning of Brady, the undisclosed information or evidence acquired through that infonnation 
must be admissible, Unitedstates v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1989), and the 
petitioner must show how the infortnation or evidence would be both material and favorable to 
his defense. I'e'erznsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 11. 15 (1987). 
Mr. Pizzuto's trial was infected by the egregious misconduct of the prosecutor and the 
trial judge. Without notice to the defense, the judge and prosecutor reached an undisclosed deal 
with James Rice that he would receive a 20 year sentence and serve even less actual time. The 
judge and prosecutor then conducted a public plea hearing at which this deal was not disclosed, 
but instead a false impression was created that Mr. Rice could expect a sentence of up to fixed 
life in prison. At Mr. Pizzuto's trial this deception contir~ued. The prosecution elicited 
lcnowingly false testimony from Mr. Rice about his plea deal and the judge, knowing this 
testimony was false, allowed it to stand uncorrected. 
The u~ldisclosed plea deal constitutes material impeachment entitling Mr. Pizzuto to relief 
under Rrady v. Matyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
The eliciting of knowingly false testimony entitles Mr. Pizzuto to relief as well. Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napzie v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Hayes 1'. Brown, 399 F.3d 
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972 (9"' Cir. 2005) (granting habeas relief because of undisclosed plea deal for State's star 
witness). 
The legitimacy ofour criminal justice system depends on the "special role played by the 
American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials." Banlts v. Dretlce, 540 U.S. at 696 
(2004) (quoting Stricklev v. Gveene, 527 U.S. at 28 1). The same principle extends to the police 
and their investigatory work in supporting the prosecution. Full disclosure, competency in the 
investigation, and confidence in the evidence is expected. The obligation ofthe prosecutor to 
disclose evidence favorable to the defense serves to "justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the 
representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not. that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done."' Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439, (quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
Napue holds that the lu~owing use of false evidence by the state, or the failure to correct 
false evidence, violates due process. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1 959). To prevail on 
a Napue claim, the petitioner must show that "(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, 
(2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) ... 
the false testimony was material." Hajles v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972,984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(omissio~~ in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the purpose of Napue claims, 
materiality is detennined by whether "there is 'any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury,"' in which case the conviction must be set aside. 
Belmontes, 414 F.3d at 11 15 (quoting United Stutes v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 ( 1  976)). "Under 
this materiality standard, [tlhe question is not whether the defendant would more likely than 1101 
have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its abse~lce he received a fair 
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trial, tn~derstood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." ffayes, 399 F.3d at 984 
(alteration in original) (intenla1 quotation inarks omitted). 
The prosecution failed to disclose certain evidence regarding favorable lreatrnent of Rice 
that was potentially impeaching or exculpatory. The district courl found that the prosecution's 
failure to disclose that Rice received lenient treatment, in the fonn of an agreed upon twenty year 
sentence, despite his admission that he killed at least one of the victims in exchange for his 
testimony against Pizzuto, did not "represent[] anything beyond impeachlnent and cumulative 
evidence." 34845 CR at 507. Even if that characterization were true, the evidence nonetheless is 
material and requires reversal. There is no question this evidence could have been useful to 
Pizzuto, as the defense attempted to portray Rice as at? unmitigated liar motivated by self-interest 
to fabricate evidence. Although the jury was aware of Rice's receiving less than death in 
exchange for testifying against Pizzuto, the fact that he did receive lenient treatment and testifted 
falsely to the degree of lenie~~cy agreed upon for his testimony at Pizzuto's trial could have given 
the jury an additional reason to distrust Rice's testimony -- and indeed the entire circumstantial 
case presented by the State. As a result of the State's non-disclosure of this evidence, the 
development of a more comprehensive theory of the co-defendants' incentives in testifyll~g was 
hindered. See Ban.ks, 540 U.S. at 691 ("Corresponding to the second Bvady co~nponent 
(evidence suppressed by the State), a petitioner shows 'cause' wllen the reason for his failure to 
develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant evidence."). 
The prosecution violated Napue by failing to correct and indeed relying upon Rice's 
testimony that he expected to get life in exchange for his cooperation in the State's case against 
Pizzuto. The Court's and State's failure to correct false testimony on this issue violated due 
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process. The ui~disclosed evidence regarding the lenient treatment Rice received, Rice's 
mislead~ng tcstimony lhal he faced "and expected a lifc sentence in exchange for his 
cooperation in the State's case against Pizzuto, and Rice's false testimony as to the place of the 
murder and actual plea agreement is material for both Bva4y and Napue purposes. 
Notwithsta~xding the prosecutor's protestations otherwise, Rice and Odom provided the 
only "direct" evidence that connected Pizzuto to the actual commission of the murders. 16489 
TR at 2 113-2120. Odom's testimony was effectively dismissed because under it, he was not 
guilty of any oirense, something the State admitted was totally incredible. The state thus relied 
solely on Rice's testimony, and for corroboration of that testimony presented the purported 
"blood evidence." Without the co-defendants' testimonies, which were not consistent with each 
other, the prosecution's case against; Pizzuto was entirely circumstantial. No fingerprints, DNA 
evidence, or eyewitness testimo~~y placed Pizzuto at the scene. See Hayes v. Rrowrz, 399 F.3d 
972,985-988 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) (holding that evidence of an undisclosed deal with a 
witness was material where the witness's testimony regarding the defendant's confession was 
undoubtedly the centerpiece of the prosecution's case and almost all of the other evidence against 
the defendant was circumsta~ltial). 
Contrary to the lower court's conclusion, the non-disclosure of Rice's lenient treatment 
was material. The failure to disclose this evidence may well have altered the outcorne of the 
trial. The prosecution's suppression of evidence and failure to correct the false testitnony was 
material, resulting in a due process violation under Bra& and Napue. Thus, not merely was 
questioning of the pl-osecution's case impeded, but the manifest falsity of that case was never 
revealed to the jury. 
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C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
ON PIZZUTO'S C1,AIMS FOR JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
At a minimum, Mr. Pizzulo is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish his claims of 
judicial bias and misconduct and his claim of prosecutorial ntisconduct 
Su~nmaly dis~nissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. Su~nmary dismissal is 
permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, 
if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant Lo the requested relief. Spnunal v. 
State, 132 Idaho 327, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App.1998). If such a factual issue is presented, 
an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Id. Inferences are liberally construed in favor of the 
nonmoving patty. Small v. State, 132 Idaho at 330-331, 971 P.2d at 1154-1 155 
1. Judicial Bias and Misconduct 
The state postconviction court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. Though Judge 
Williamson initially was sufficiently concerned by the allegations to permit a limited hearing on 
the assertion that Judge Reinhardt made comments to a state's witness during the trial which 
illustrated a pre-determination of the trial and sentencing results, that Order was ultimately 
vacated by Judge Owen. 34545 CR at 637-647. There has never been a meaningful opportunity 
for the district court to assess the credibility of the affiants who submitted affidavits or to 
determine whether the court's actions at trial sentencing were so adversarial and pre-judgmental 
as to render the sentencing trial hr~damentally unfair 
This is not a case involving merely an uncon-oborated news report or rumor. Nor does 
this case involve a conclusory proffer of judicial misconduct. The proffer is that there is now 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 30 
evidence that the judge actively participated and directed the plea negotiations with the co- 
defendant's cour~sel aud the prosecutor to secure testimony agaiilst Mr. Pizzuto, oulside the 
presence or knowledge of Petitioner or his counsel, (34845 CR at 42-46); that the judge 
participated in arranging and directing the acquisition of evidence at or near the same time as the 
plea negotiations; (Id. at 198-199); that the trial and sentencing judge made an affinnative 
statement of pre-judgement pre-trial to a state's witness (Angelina Rawson) and made 
affinnative statements relevant to sentencing to members of the jury prior to the sentencirzg 
hearing that demonstrated hue animosity towards Petitioner. 34845 CR at 293 and 274-277. See 
also, Id. at 279-282 and 287-289. 
Add to that the proffer of the three persons who have previously come forward with 
specific and reliable evidence that the judge had a fixed predisposition to sentence this particular 
defendant to death before he was convicted by the jury. See 24802 CR at 179-184. Affidavits of 
Gerald R. Pirmto, Sr., Pattrela Pizzuto; Toni King. Those declaratiolis now take on additional 
credibility as a result of the declarations ofboth Angelina Rawson, the state's witness and the 
court reporter, Gloria McDougall, who revealed similar statements made by this judge about 
another defendant who he sente~lced to death. 34845 CR Exh. 26. 
The extra-judicial expressions of actual bias, and prosecutorial actions of the judge create 
a presumption that the activity was prejudicial. The burden was on the prosecution to prove that 
there was no prejudice. At the v e ~ y  least, due process demands illat the Petitioner is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing to permit cornplete inquiry. More importantly, however, Judge 
Williamsoil's denial ofthe evidentiary hearing regarding the ex parte nleeting on Rice's plea, the 
judge's silence during Rice's false testimony and the resurrection of corroborating physical 
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evidence to support Rice's latest version of events denlands a court hearing. Without, the 
execution of Jerry Pizzuto on the word of James Rice reeks of an outright injustice. 
2. Prosecutoriat Misconduct 
In the court below, Mr. Pizzuto submitted affidavits that have been neither challenged nor 
retkted; the record plainly shows the prosecutor withheld critical infonnation regarding the 
gathering of physical evidence, withheld evidence of the plea agreement with the co-defendant, 
James Rice, and stood by silently or may have actively promoted the co-defendant's false 
testimony. As argued above, Mr. Pizzuto is entitled to relief on the Brady and Napue errors 
alleged. Alternatively, he is at a minimum entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the acts of the 
prosecut.or, state agents and trial and sentencing court in failing to ciisclose the ex parte 
proceedings and standing by while false testimony was given to the jury. 
Rice and Odom potentially faced the death penalty themselves. By admit finger-pointing 
toward Mr. Pizzuto, they were able to avoid a death sentence. See Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 
627, 826 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Idaho App. 1992). Their life-saving deals required that the attorneys 
for both Rice and Odom, the prosecutor, and the trial court engage in plea bargaining. His 
defense coui~sel at trial was deprived of essential information that should have been disclosed 
because the only interested party not present or represented at those proceedings was Mr. 
Pizzuto. He is entitled to know what assertions and representations were made to the judge to 
persuade hit11 to accept the plea recommendations and from which the court concluded Mr. 
Pizzuto deserved a death sentence while the co-defendant's did not. See Gardner v. FIorida, 430 
U.S. 349 (1977); see also, Sivalcv. State, 112 Idaho 197,205,731 P.2d 192,200 (Idaho 1986). 
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Mr. Pizzuto's allegations are sufficient to merit a grant of discovery and an evidentiary 
3. The Newly Assigned District Judge Abused His Discretion in 
Reconsidering the Prior Assigned Judge's Ruling That an Evidentiary 
Bearing on the Judge's Nlisconduct Was Appropriate and Surv~nnarily 
Disil~issing tile Claim 
The newly assigned district court judge, Won. Patrick Owen, like Judge Williamson 
herself retained discretion to reconsider any i~tterlocutory decision in this case. I.R.C.P. 
1 l(a)(2)(B). See Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63,878 P.2d 762 (1994). In this case, 
the reconsideration by Judge Owen of Judge Williamson's Order for an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue of judicial misconduct was inappropriate and an abuse of discretion. The State offered 
no new evidence to support its substantive position regarding the Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. The state presented no "new facts to create an issue," providing the Court with "no 
basis upon which to reconsider" the Order. Jordan 11. Beeln, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908, 
914 (2001); I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's 
attention to the new facts." Coeur d'Alene v. FFst Nut. BankofNorth idaho, 118 Ida110 812, 
823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
A trial court properly grants a "motion for reconsideration of an i~lterlocutoly order 
porsua~~t to 1R.C.P. 1 l(a)(Z)(B)" 011 the basis of any -new or additional facts, and a more 
colnprehensive presentation of both law and fact," because "the chief virtue of a reconsideration 
is lo obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be 
ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as may be." Coeur d'illene A4inrining Co. v. First Nut. Bank 
of Aiorth Idaho, 118 Idaho at 823,800 P.2d at 1037 (1990). See also Nationsbanc Mortg. Cory. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 33 
of New Yorlc v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879, 884, 908 P.2d 572, 577 (Ct. App. 1995) (denial of 
reconsideration proper where new evidence did not create "a genuine issue of material fact"); 
Noreetz v. Price Development Co. Ltd. Par&nership, 135 Idaho 8 16,s 19, 25 P.3d 129, 132 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (in deciding a [notion for reconsideration "a trial courl [nay consider new or 
additional facts presented with the motion."); Idaho First Nut. Bank v. David Steed and 
Associates, Inc., 121 Ida110 356, 361, 825 P.2d 79, 84 (1992) (newly presented banking expert's 
affidavit and bank loan manual properly considered under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(Z)(B)); Accord 
McDonald v. Doust, 11 ldaho 14, 81 P. 60, 67 (1905) (Stockslager, C.J., dissenting) (motion for 
rehearing in the Supreme Court should be denied when "the questions raised in the petition for 
rehearing were all argued at length when the cause was heard, and no new question is suggested 
by the petition."). 
Offering no new evidence to support a reconsideration, the State also conveniently 
omitted any reference to the affidavit of court reporter Gloria MeDougall, which was obtained 
and filed by Petitioner after Judge Williamson's grant of the hearing. This affidavit, made by a 
veteran court reporter, who did considerable work for Judge Reiilhardt, (and a person who has no 
conr~ection with Mr. Pizzuto), contains information that Judge Reinhardt has previously made 
remarkably similar comments to those attributed to him by Ms. Rawson and which cast doubt on 
his role as an ilnpartial arbiter in another death penalty case tried shortly before Mr. Pizzuto's.' 
' That same affidavit has been found sufficient to permit Bryan Lankford to file a 
successive petition for writ of habeas corpus, notwithstanding the strict standards for the same 
under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S. C. §2254(a). See Bryan 
Latzkford L. Smith, USDC Case No. CV-08-00484-BLW, Dkt. 1, 11110108. 
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That new evidence fortifies Judge Williaunson's order to have a hearing on Judgc Reinhardt's 
misconduct and predisposition to sentence Petitioner to death prior to the sentencing hearing. 
Not ollly did the State fail to provide any factual basis for a reconsideration motion, it 
offers no new legal arguments but merely rehashed the arguments already made to Judge 
Williamson. Reconsideration of the same was unnecessary and in this case, it was an abuse of 
discretion. The State's reconsideration motion should have been denied and the evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of the trial sentencing judge's extra-ordinary and unconstitutional bias 
should have proceeded as previously ordered. Mr. Pizzuto is entitled to demonstrate not only 
that Judge Reinhardt intended to "bum his ass" but was prepared to go to extraoc-dinary lengths in 
order to do so. 
4. The Denial of Depositions of the Prosecutor, Sheriff, Judge and other 
actors in Support of His Rtotion and Preparation for Evidentiary 
Hearing Was an Abuse of Discretion and Denied Mr. Pizzuto His Due 
Process Rights to Full and Fair Consideration of the lssues 
I11 support of his petition, Mr. Pizzuto requested discovery and an evidentiary hearing to 
assist in developing the facts in this petition and preseilting it to the Coua. 34845 CK at 26. 
Thereafter, Petitioner specifically sought to take the depositions of George R. Reinhardt, 111, 
Senior District Judge, Henry Boomer, former Idaho County Prosecutor, Randy Baldwin, fonner 
Sheriff of Idaho County, Greg FitzMauriee, court-appointed counsel for co-defendant, William 
Odom, Wayne MacGregor, James Rice's counsel, Jeff Payne, Idaho County Prosecutor and Scott 
Wayman, former co-counsel for Petitioner. Id. at 376-378. 'The Court granted only a very 
limited inquiry of Henry Boomer and Randy Baldwin, nanxely four (4) written intenogatory 
questions to the two other persons who were present at the dinner in which the sentencing judge 
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remarked that he was going to "hang" Arlgellina Rawson's brother. See Id. at 293 and 5 16. The 
court's grant of discovery is focused solely on the limited evidentiary hearing Judge Willian~son 
granted on the question of Judge Rei~lhardt's bias as illustrated at that dinner. Id. at 515-516. 
The denial of the depositions of relevant actors to the newly discovered circumsta~ces of the plea 
agreen~ertt and the blood evidence, as well as the unwarranted utterance of prejudice evir~cing a
pre-determination of both guilt and sentence voiced by the sentencing judge, created reversible 
error 
As the ABA GUIDELBIES FOR THE APPOWTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATR PENaTY CASES (2003), ("ABA Guidelines") acknowledge, 
[Tjhe high percentage of reversals and disturbingly large number of innocent 
persons sentenced to death [de~nonstrate that] the trial record is unlikely to 
provide either a co~npletc or accui-ate picture of the facts and issues in the case. 
That inay be because of information concealed by the state, because of witnesses 
who did not appear at trial or who testified falsely, because the trial attocrzey did 
not conduct an adequate investigation in the first instance, because new 
developmer~ts how the inadequacies of prior farensic evidence, because of jumr 
misconduct, or for a variety of other reasons. 
Id. at Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1. For these reasons, among others, the ABA Guidelines 
prescribe that postconviction cou~lsel obtain and tltoroughly review all records and files 
pertaining to the defendant, and then "seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously 
presented, that are arguably meritorious[.]" ABA Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties of Postconviction 
Counsel"). Postconviction counsel must "htly discharge the ongoing obligations imposed by" 
the ABA Guidelines, including the duty to use discovery mcchallisms "to secure information in 
the possession of the prosecution or law enforcemerlt authorities[.]" Commentary to Guideline 
10.7 ("lnvestigation") 
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The factual premise of the Commentary quoted above, however, also vests in Petitioner a 
due process right to discovery: The high percentage of reversals in capital cases and large number 
of innocent persons sentenced to death make it plainly unfair to deny death sentenced persons 
access to facts which may compel reversing their conviction or sentence. This right to discovery 
is strengthened by the Eighth Amendment mandate that death sentences and capital convictions 
are valid only to the extent that they meet heightened reliability requirements. See Herrera 1). 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390,405 (1993)f'We have, of course, held that the Eighth Amendment 
requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be imposed."); 
Murray v. Giarralano, 492 U.S. 1,8-9 (1989)(plurality op. of Rehuquist, C.J.)(collecting cases); 
id. at 21-22 nn.9- 10 (Stevens J., dissenting)(eollecting cases); Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 
668,686-87 (1984); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (because death is qualitatively 
different from any sentence of imprisonment, %there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"); see 
also, Furnzan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). CJ: McCleslcey v. 
Zaizt, 499 U.S. 467,498 (1991) ("The requirement of cause in the abuse-of-the-writ context is 
based on the principle that petitioner must conduct a reasonable and diligent investigation aimed 
at including all relevant claims and grounds for relief in the first federal habeas petition."). 
Generally, in postconviction proceedings discove~y is subject to the court's discretion. 
1.Cr.R. 57(b). However, petitioners are entitled as a matter of federal and state constitutional law 
to disclosure by the state of exculpatory information, including but not limited to impeachtnent 
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infotniation. Brady v. Mayland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Unitedslates v. Bngley, 473 U.S. 657 
(1985);State v. Dallas, 109 [daho 670, 710 P.2d 580(1985). 
While Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87, clearly applies to disclosure of exculpatory 
information before and during trial, the United States Supreme Court has not expressly held in a 
criminal case whether it applies post-trial. There is good autliority, however, that even in post- 
conviction the prosecution has an ongoiilg obligation to disclose this kind of evidence to the 
defense. In a civil rights case, the United States Supreme Court observed that, at minimurn, an 
ongoing ethical responsibility to disclose exculpatory information does apply post-cortviction: 
"after conviction the prosecutor is also bound by the ethics of his office to infolm the appropriate 
authority of afteracquired or other information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the 
conviction." Irnbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427, n. 25 (1976). In Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 
F.2d 746, 749- 50 (9th Cir. 1992) the Ninth Circuit held that the state has duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence under Bradji during a habeas corpus proceeding. Osborne v. District 
Attorney's Oficefor the Third JudicialDistrict, 52t F.3d 11 18, 1128 (9th Cir. 2008) expressly 
extends Thomas IL Goldsmith ruling, with the court holding that Brady applies to any post- 
conviction proceeding). The thrust of the importance of disclosure has only recently been 
reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit. See Tennison v. City and County ofSon Francisco, - F.3d -, 
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24654 (9'h Cir. December 8,2008). 
Idaho Criininal Rule 57(b), therefore, does not apply to exculpatory information within 
the scope of Bvady, Dallas, and their progeny, and the Court sl~ould have directed the state to 
immediately produce any and all such iitformation it is or should be aware of. Kyles v. Wzitley, 
514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) ("[Tlhe individual prosecutor has a duty lo learn of any favorable 
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evidence k,~>own to the others acting 011 the government's behalf in the case, including the 
police."). To the extent that Ida110 Criminal Rule 57 supersedes state and federal constitutional 
requirements, it is co~~stitutionally infirm 
This Court's holding that discovery must be granted to the extent that i t  is necessary to 
protect the petitioner's substantial rights, Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602,605,21 P.3d 924, 
927 (200 I), must conternplate granting requests for orders that the prosecution disclose Brady 
material. Put another way, every postcouviction petitioner has substantial rights -specifically, 
state and federal constitutionally guaranteed rights under Article I ,  Section 6, 13 of the lrlaho 
Constitution and the federal Sixth, Eighth, aud Fourteeltth Ainen&nents -to the prosecution's 
disclosing exculpatory information. 
The Court's finding that a deposition of the trial judge was unnecessary because "Pizzuto 
can not inquire into what Judge Reiilhardt thought when he decided the case," 34845 CR at 516, 
was evideldiarily and constitutionally too narrow. As noted in a case cited by the court, "While a 
party may be allowed to take post-conviction depositions of the trial judge, this should only occur 
when the testimony of the judge is absolutely necessary to establish circumstances not in the 
record." State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1994). 
Petitioner specifically averred: 
The scope of the deposition will be the extra-judicial activities of the trial 
judge and his ex parte communicafions and associations with the prosecutors, 
witnesses, jurors, defense couilsel and any other law enforcement official or agent 
of the state in regard to the pre-trial, trial, sei~tenci~lg and post-conviction matters 
of Gerald Pizzuto, Williarn Odom, Jalnes Rice or Lene Odom and any other 
matters concerning the alleged prosecutorial misconduct or judicial bias and 
misconduct. 
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34845 CR at 376-377. Petitioner's request to depose George Reinhardt was specifically related 
to what the judge did and said, not merely what he thought. 
In McKenzie v. Risley, 915 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed a lower court decision and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ex parte 
comn~unicatiolls between a judge and prosecutor, notii~g that tile inquiry is '' not whether 
sentencing was in fact discussed at an ex parte meeting but whether the judge and prosecutors 
"discussed matters related to the merits of the case or potentially bearing on sentencing." 91 5 
F.2d at 1398. Petitioner, having established that an ex parte meeting with Rice's counsel 
occurred, was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that meeting. Id. 
Petitioner was at a rniniinum entitled to inquire further into those meetings, if not by 
evidentiary hearing, then by deposition and discovery. The denial of the same was an abuse of 
discretion and violated Petitioner's due process rights and right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment. U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 8, 14; Idaho Const. Art. I ,  sec. 6, 13 
D. THE COURT'S ORDER STRIHNG DECLARATIONS IN WHOLE OR IN 
PART, PILED TO SUPPORT THE PETITION, WAS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION AND DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
Petitioner filed numerous affidavits and declarations in support of his petition (and 
amended petition). The Court in its June 1,2006 Order struck in part or in whole a number of 
those declarations. 34845 CR at 51 7-518. it is respectfully urged that those documents struck in 
toto, namely, 2-6 through 2-15 and the Affidavit of Ronald D. Howen, were relevant and 
admissible for the corlsideratioil of the claims made. The Order striking the same was an abuse 
of discretion and ultimately denies Petitioner his right to be fully heard on t.he critical 
constitutional issues before the Court in violation of the rules of evidence, procedures for post. 
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conviction under Idaho Code 19-2729 and the United States and Idaho constitutional guarantees 
to due process and to be bee of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. Amends. 5,8, 14; 
Idaho Const. Art. 1, see. 6, 13. 
The environment in which Mr. Pizzuto's death sentence was orchestrated cannot be 
ignored. The trial judge presided over Petitioner's trial and sentence, the co-defendants' 
proceedings arid all five of Petitioner's postconviction  proceeding^,'^ over claims of bias and 
prejudice and inappropriate extrajudicial contact." 
The relevance of the declarations are shown in the manner in which the rural isoIatio11 of 
Ida110 County lent itself to uilholy alliances between the trial judge and most, if not all, of the 
relevant actors in this case including: 
t. The sheriff, Randy Baldwin, the person in charge of the crime scene, who had 
previously tampered with a crime scene, 34845 CR Exh. 10, (Appendix Z-I2), and who has been 
charged and tried for criminal offenses three times, 34845 CR Exh. 10, (Appendices 2-7 and Z- 
15). Mr. Baldwin has been indicted or charged with three felony offenses, including grand the& 
illegal wiretapping and drugs and althougli acquitted, has ultilnately leff Idaho County and law 
' O  Pizzuto v. State, Idaho County No. 23001 (consolidated PCR) - Idaho Supreme Court 
Appeal No. 16489; Pizzuto v. State, Idaho Counly No. SP-00961 & 23001 (IAC PCR) - Idaho 
Supreme Court Appeal No. 21637; Pizzuto v. State, Idaho County No. SP-1837 (1st Brady PCR) 
- Idaho Supreme Court Appeal No. 24802; Pizzuto v. State, Idalto County No. 22075 1 33907 
(Ring PCR) - Idaho Supreme Court Appeal No. 32677 i 32678; and Pizztato v. State, Idaho 
County No. CV03-34748 (Atkins PCR) - Idaho Supreme Court Appeal No. 32679. 
" See e.g., Petitioner's Notice of Lodging, paragraph 2A pp. 148, 185 and 175, 
paragraph 3A, paragraph 3C(6-8), 3C(15 and 16) (34845 CR Exh. 4) and Stipulation for the 
Court to Take Judicial Notice, paragraph B(3) pp. 1-2, and B(1) pp. 55-68 (34845 CR at 354- 
355). 
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enforcement. I-iis reputation even atnong deputies with wbotn he worked supports Petitioner's 
contention that the critne scene evidence was tampered with and misrepresented. 34845 CR Exh. 
$0,  (Appendix 2-2). 
2. The prosecutor, 14enry Boomer, who participated with the judge in the coordiuatiotl of 
James Rice's plea and who durit~g the pretrial, trial, sentencing and postconviction proceedings 
followed direction of the court in the presentation of evidence. Mr. Boomer reportedly engaged 
in extrajudicial activities with the witnesses and the judge in this case. See e.g., 34845 CR at 41- 
46. 
3. The bailiff, Ja~nes Howell, an acquaintance of Judge Reinhardt with no prior 
experience as a bailiff, was hand-selected by the trial judge and entered into a sexual liason with 
one of the jurors during the trial. 34845 CR Exh. 10, (Appendix 2-10). 
4. The defense counsel, Nicholas Chenoweth, an experienced ttial lawyer had previously 
hired the trial judge as his law clerk and socialized with him. Pizzuto v. Stnte, Idaho County 
SP00961, Affidavits of Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. (dated March 10, 1994, filed April 7, 1994) and 
Affidavit of John Radin, (dated April 1, 1994, filed April 7, 1994). Curiously, Mr. Cl~et~oweth 
was also appointed on the postconviction case of Mark Lankford in which prosecutorial 
misconduct in failing to reveal a plea agreement was raised and rejected by Judge Reinhardt on 
procedural grounds. (Mark) Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100,897 P.2d 991 (1995). it was later 
found that the allegation of prosecutorial lnisconducl was true. (Bryan) Lankj'o~~l v. State, 127 
Idaho 608,614, 903 P. 2d 1305, 13 1 1 (1995) 
It is in that context that the recently discovered undisclosed deal with Rice must be 
understood. It is perhaps Inore a statenlent about rural justice than actual co~lspiracy to convict 
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and execute a possibly innocent person, but the consequence of the unconstitutioiial actions of 
the relevant players is the same. The declarations supporting the context in whicll Judge 
Reinhardt's extra-judicial activities took place is relcvant and necessary to an adequate 
understailding of the chaotic and constitutionally deficient environment in which Mr. Pizzuto 
was tried and sentenced to death. 
The affidavits were submitted to support Petitioner's allegations of the trial judge's ex 
parte contacts and knowledge of matters not properly before it. To the extent that there may be 
irrelevant or inadmissible evideuce in any single affidavit, the lower court was capable of 
distilling the relevant information and disrcgarding the inadmissible poilions. As the United 
States Supreme Court noted in Mavylandv. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 91 2 (1950), 
Judges are supposed to be made of sterner stuff than to be influenced by 
irresponsible statements regarding pending cases. They are trained to put aside 
inadmissible evidence and while we, of course, recognize our limitations, I think 
that most Judges, at least, are fairly able to disregard improper influences which 
may have reached their attention. 
Id. at 913-14; seealso CityojMcCall~i Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588, 130 P.3d 1118, 1126 
(2006) ("The City's arguments that the affidavit is irrelevant, Lacking in foundation and based 
upon 
hearsay are likewise without merit, particularly in light of the district judge's statement that be 
would consider the affidavit and 'give it the weight to which [he] think[s] it's entitled.' "); Myers 
v. Wovkrnen k Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504,95 P.3d 977,986 (2004) (refusal to strike 
affidavit was not error). 
Idaho Code Section 19-4907(a) pennits the Court to "receive proof by affidavits, 
depositions, oral testimony or other evidence[.]" I.C. 5 19-4907(a). The relevance of the 
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affidavits here is set out above and could have more reasonably been deterrnitled when the court 
held an evidentiary hearing and considered briefi~~g on the merits. The court's striking of the 
affidavit before an evidentiary hearing and without appreciation or understanding of their 
relevance, was enor. The astidavits were submitted to show in part that Judge Reinhardt's ex 
parte comnlunication in this case was not unprecedented, a valuable evidentiary point given that 
the Judge's behavior was so shocking that it. might be hard to believe, absent this powerful 
corroboration. The supporting affidavits show that the set~tencing judge had out-of-court a 
parte contact with some of the jurors discussing the jurors' verdict and Petitioner's criminal 
activities before he proceeded to the sentencing. See Gillingham Construction, Inc. v. Newby- 
Wiggins Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 121 P.3d 946, 956 (2005)f'To the extent there is a 
practice of trial judges engaging jurors in a dialogue of questions and answers following a 
verdict, but before post trial matters, including sentencing, are heard and decided, it is improper. 
It is no diffcrent than any other exparte contact that tnay influence the outcome of a 
proceeding.") The court's refusal to consider the declarations/ affidavits in support of the 
petition was reversible enor. 
E. BECAUSE PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT THE FIRST DEGREE 
MURDERS OF DEL AND BERTA HEIUVDON, HIS CONVICTIONS AND 
SENTENCES OF DEATH ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTI%, 
EIGHTIT AND EWURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION AND HERRERA C.: COLLINS, 506 U.S. 390 
(1993) 
The testimony of James Rice is not credible and no ratioual trier of fact could have found 
it so, had the trier been aware of the deal pursuanl to which Mr. Rice testified. This is 
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demonstrated by the difficulty the jury actually had in rendering a verdict of guilty in the first 
instance. 34845 CR at 274-285. 
Furthermore, no trier of fact who was made aware that Mr. Odoin, the only other 
percipient witness against Mr. Pizzuto vegarding the murders, had worlced as a paid informant 
and that tile State had knowingly produced false evidence about the presence of blood in the 
cabin and had falsely introduced evidence regarding blood on Mr. Pizzuto's clothes, would have 
convicted Mr. Pizzuto of first degree murder. 
Tlie United States Supreme Court decision in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538-39 (2006) 
recognizes that the standard for actual innocence as a gateway tlxough otherwise procedurally 
defaulted claims, must be considered in ligbt of the new evidence as it might affect the jttry's 
consideration in viewing the record 0,s a whole. Id. The lower courts did not view the record as 
a whole but analyzed and ruled upon each proffer as if they were to be considered in isolation. 
See 34845 CR at 456-521 and 637-648. The jury having heard that the judge participated in the 
plea negotiations and having then understood the relevance to the newly found blood evidence, 
together with the motivation and incredibility of Jarftes Rice and the lack of any admissions by 
Petitioner, may well have determined that Petitioner was at most a party to a lesser offense or 
prosecuted simply by association and prior record 
F. THE DISTRICT COURTS' SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION 
WAS ERROR 
1. The Law Governing Summary Dismissal 
Generally post-conviction clairns are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act, 1.C. 319-4901 et a1 (hereinafter UPCPA). Successive post-conviction 
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applications filed under UPCPA are prohibited only in those cases where the petitioner 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the grounds for which hc now seelts relief, or 
offers no sufficient reason for the omission. Palmer v. Devmitt, 102 Idaho 591,635 P.2d 955 
(1981). 
In capital cases, however, the UPCPA is modified by Idaho Code 3 19-271 9. Section 19- 
2719 does not eliminate the application of the UPCPA to capital cases; it supersedes the UPCPA 
only to the extent provisions conflict. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700,992 P.2d 144,149 
(1999). Under 519-2719, a petitioner must file post-conviction claims within 42 days of 
judgment or is required to make apvima facie showing that the issues raised were not known and 
could not reasonably have been known within those 42 days. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 
807,820 P.2d 665,677 (1991); Paz v. State, I23 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1993). 
The reviewing courts have refused to auto~natically foreclose filings beyond the 42 days 
set forth in I.C. 5 19-2719. Issues raised after the initial 42 days must be asserted within a 
"reasonable" time after they are known or could have been know11. Paz v. Stale, 123 Idaho 758, 
760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1993). Where an issue could not have been known within 42 days, 
Idaho courts have required the petitioner to assert the issue "soon after the issue is known." 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 701,992 P.2d 150 (1999). Determining what constitutes a 
"reasonable" time or "soon" after discovery is fact specific. For example, claims brought four 
years after the opening appellate brief was filed have been precluded, Puz v. State, 123 Idaho 
758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1993), but second petitions filed where the claims were not 
known until shortly before the second filing have been upheld as timely. Stuart v. Slate, 118 
Idaho 932,934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1990). This Court has now held that a "reasonable time" 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 46 
is forty-two days unless Petitioner shows that extraordinary circumstances prevented the filing 
Pizzuto V. State, - P.3d - 2008 WL 466568 at % (Idaho 2008). 
2. These Proceedings are Not Controlled by Idaho Code Section 19-2719 
Under Idaho Code Section 19-4901(4), post-conviction relief is available to a person 
claiming that there "exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the convictiotl or sentence in the interest of justice." The manifest injustice 
language is not precluded by I.C. 3 19-2719 and is therefore available in capital cases. See 
McKinney, 133 Idalio at 700; 992 P.2d at 149 (1999). For the reasons stated herein, including the 
fact that in light of the claim now raised the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilt 
or a sentence of deatli, Petitioner has unquestionably suffered a manifest injustice which if not 
remedied will result in his unwarranted death. 
More importantly, this Court has recognized its jurisdiction to consider claims 
notwithstanding Idaho Code Section 19-2719. In Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641,8 P.3d 636 
(2000), the Court addressed the merits of a Bvady claim raised in a successive postconviction. In 
rejecting the State's argument that petitioner should be precluded from raising an old claim anew 
based on recently discovered evidence of the State's misconduct, the Court unequivocally 
opined: 
Applying this rule as the State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable 
to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive post-conviction petitions, 
even where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed by 
prosecutorial misconduct. We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that 
will work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency. 
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Sivak ti. State, 134 Idaho at 647, 8 P.2d at 642. Any application of Idaho Code Section 19-2719 
which precludes review of Petitioner's current claims will work an egregious injustice and is 
simply not the law in the State of Idaho. 
In this case, inany of those factors identified as having led to the convictio~l and sentence 
of innocent people, including but not limited to the reliance on testilnony of infonna~zts, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and the petitioner's limited mental 
functioning are present in this case. See Liebman and Fagan, "A Broken System, Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973-1998," l~ttp://www2.law.mlumbia.edu/instmctionalsewiceslieb1nan; 2004 
Innocence Repoit, Death Penalty Information Cer~ter, http:Nwww.deathpenaltyinfo.org; Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,3 18 (2002). 
Here, where the state's case is weak, wholly reliant on unreliable co-defendants' 
testimony and questionable forensic evidence, the very real possibility that Mr. Pizzuto is not 
only the least culpable of the four defendants but. inay be innocent of the offense altogether, 
compels this Court to review the nrerits of the case anew and precludes the application of the 
procedural bar advocated by the State. 
3. The Claims Are Presented in Compliance with Idaho Code Section 19- 
2719 
a. The Petition Raises Credible lssues of Material Facts 
As discussed in detail above, the petition here is supported by sworn statements setting 
forth mate~ial credible facts. The lower court's finding that the "deal" entered into by the 
prosecutor and Rice is impeaching and cumulative only is insufficient to deny relief. See 34845 
CR at 51 5. See also, Giglio, supra. The substantive arguments above makes clear that the 
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allegations of prosecutorial n~isconduct and judicial bias and misconduct raise credible issues of 
material facts in compliance with Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5). To the extent $19-2719 
precludes relief for undisclosed evidence and false testimony regarding evidence that is 
impeaching andlor cumulative, it is unconstitutional. 
i. Judicial Misco~~duct 
The court misapprehended the scope and impact of the judicial misconduct alleged. The 
judge's active participation in the prosecution of the case against Mr. Pizzuto, including engaging 
in active plea negotiations with Mr. Rice's counsel, determining exactly what testimony of Mr. 
Rice would be acceptable and agreeing to a twenty year sentence, directing the acquisition of 
forensic evidence consistent with Mr. Rice's acceptable version of events, his assurances to the 
jurors ofthe appropriateness of their verdict, without revealing any of that activity to Petitioner, 
deprived Petitioner of a fair and impartial factfinder. That Judge Reinhardt presided over the 
trial and sentence of Petitioner was a violation of due process, as was his continued iusistence 
that he preside over the postconviction proceedings despite numerous allegations of bias and 
prejudice. As a result ofthe judge's conduct, Petitioner is entitled to a new trial, new sentencing 
and at the very least, postconviction proceedings regarding the ineffective assistance of cou~~sel  
and prosecutorial misconduct before a judge who is not biased and wholly lacking in the 
constitutional requirement of impartiality. 
The judge's participation in the plea negotiations was unconstitutional and is reversible 
error. While judge-involved negotiations may have been appropriate to Mr. Rice, they were 
wholly inappropriate to Mr. Pizzuto. Negotiations which resulted in the trial judge's 
commitment to a version of events which placed all of the murderous acts on Mr. Pizzuto, and 
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acts in directing the coordination of acquisition of questionable corroborating evidence, outside 
the presence of Mr. Pizzuto or his cou~lsel and prior to hearing a single witness in Mr. Pizzuto's 
trial, took kom Mr. Pizzuto his most fundamental right - his right to a fair and impartial trial, 
presided over by a fair and inlpartial judge and factfinder. 
This Court has stated in proceedings now under scrutiny that "a judge may not be 
disqualified for prejudice unless it is shown that the prejudice is directed against the party and is 
of such nature and character as would render it improbable that under the circumstances the party 
could have a Fair and impartial trial." Pizzuto v. Stale, 134 Idaho 793,799, 10 P.3d 742,748 
(2000); accord State v. Lanlrfbrd, 113 Idaho 688,700,747 P.2d 710,722 (1987)oveuruled on 
othev grounds in Lanlifovd v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991)(where the United States Supreme Court 
found that Judge Reinhardt violated Bryan Lankford's due process rights by failing to give 
adequate notice that he was contemplating the imposition of the death sentence in spite of the 
State's notice that it was not seeking death. 500 U.S. at 127). Under the standard set forth in 
Pizzuto and Lankford, Judge Reiuhardt has demonstrated strong and clear prejudice against the 
petitioner, that is of such nature and character as would render it not just improbable, but cerlain, 
that petitioner did not have a fair and impartial trial or sentencing. Under the Judicial Canons, 
controlling rules of Idaho Civil Procedure, and the state and federal co~lstilutional provisions 
outlined above, Judge Reinhardt's partiality is not only subject to reasonable question but is 
completely clear: he was a biased judge and necessarily had to be disqualified under the above 
precedents. His judicial misco~lduct renders Mr. Pizzuto's trial and sentencing a mockery. This 
injustice cannot be permitted to result in the execution of Mr. Pizzuto. 
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When reviewing whether a petilioner's sentence is reliable, the Eighth Amendment 
pi-ohibition against cruel and unusual punishment mandates that greater safeguards be applied to 
capital than non-capital sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolirra, 428 U.S. 
280, 305 (1 976) (death is different and requires greater reliability in the detennination that the 
sentence is appropriate). The Fourteenth A~llendme~~t due process guarantee inandates that 
heightened standards of reliability be applied to guilt phase proceedings as well. See, e.g., Beck 
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,638 (1980)("To insure that the death penalty is indeed iinposed on the 
basis of 'reason rather than caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended 
to diminish the reliability oT the sentencing detennination. The same reasoning must apply to 
rules that diminish the reliability of the guilt detennination."). Additionally, because Idaho's 
capital sentencing scheme provides that the senteucer consider all guilt phase evidence, the 
Eighth Amendment requires that tile safeguards applied in reviewing guilt phase proceedings be 
greater in capital than non-capital cases. Idaho Code 5 19-251 5(e) ("Evidence admitted at trial 
shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing."). Consequently, both the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's independent due process guarantee require that this Court more readily find that a 
material issue of fact is raised by capital than non-capital petitioners, regardless of whether the 
issue concerns guilt or sentencing proceedings. 
Finally, the pervasive corrosive effect of the continued assignment of this case and its 
related postconviction proceedings to Judge Reinhardt, over the insistent objections of Mr. 
Pizzuto, cannot be overstated. Idaho Code 19-2719 grailts a substantive right of postconvietion 
review to capital defendantslpetitioners to ensure that their death sentences are valid. State v. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 51 
Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891,893 (1992). With the continued review of that 
originally flawed trial and sentence by the same biased factfinder, Mr. Pizzuto's due process 
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Ameudments to the Constitutioll and the Idaho State 
Constitution, as well as the prollibition of the inflictioll of cruel and unusual puuishlnent 
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 6, 
have been violated. 
ii. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
It was Rice's testimony that described the travels and activities of the co-defendants 
leading to the murders of the I-Ierndons, including details of where the killings purportedly took 
place and his claim to have heard Pizzuto bludgeon the victims followed by his so-called "act of 
mercy" in shooting Mr. Hemdon. It was Rice's testimony that minimized his participation in the 
events and maximized Pizzuto's. And most importantly, it was Rice's testimony that purported 
to reveal that Pizzuto admitted to the offense and threatened Rice if he informed anyone. 16489 
CR at 22 12-2 123. As the Supreme Court has noted, "A confession is like no other evidence. 
Indeed, 'the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence 
that can be admitted against him.' "Arizona v. FuEvtinante, 499 U.S. 279,296 (1991) (quoting 
Rvuton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). 
Because Rice's testimony was critical to the prosecution's case, it is reasonably probable 
that the result of the trial would have been different had evidence of the deal been disclosed. 
The prosecution's failure to disclose the deal between Rice and the police violated Brady. The 
rule in this situation is clear and specific: the prosecution must disclose material evidence 
favorable to the defense. Brady, 373 US.  at 87. Where the prosecution fails to disclose 
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evidence such as the existence of a leniency deal or promise that would be valuable in 
impeaching a witness whose testimony is central to the prosecution's case, it violates the due 
process rights of the accused and undermines co~lfide~tcc in the outcome of the trial. Napue, 360 
U.S. at 270; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444. Not only did t l~e  prosecutio~l fail to 
disclose a promise of a twenty year sentence given to Rice, its "star witness," in exchange for his 
testimony, testimony that provided evidence of a motive and the opportu~~ity to kill the victim 
and that included incrin~inatiilg statements by Pizzuto himself. More egregiously, the prosecutor 
emphasized the fact that Mr. Rice faced spending his natural life in prison as a result of his plea. 
16489 CR at 2161,2163, 2168. Considered iildividually and jointly, these allegations offact 
credibly raise material issues offact which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Brady v. 
Mauyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Unitedstates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 ( 1  972). Idaho is in accord. Summary dismissal for failure to raise material issues of fact in 
this case is clearly unwarranted. 
b. The Petition is Timely Filed 
Petitioner has been at all times diligent in his efforts to assert his claims. However, it was 
only shortly before the filing of the petition that James Rice finally admitted that he testified 
against Petitioner it1 exchange for promises not revealed to Petitioner, specifically, an agreed 
upon sentence of twenty years in which he was assured by the state that he would serve 
significantly fewer years. That admission, despite prior interviews with Mr. Rice, was only made 
to an investigator of Petitioner's counsel in September, 2005 and acknowledged under oath 011 
the 281h day of September, 2005. 34845 CR at 3 1-34, The discovery of undisclosed benefits was 
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corroborated under oath by Mr. Rice's ex-wife, Joy Tara, on October 14,2005. Id. at 36-39. 
Further corroboration is provided by notes and billings of Mr. Rice's counsel, authenticated by 
the custodian of those records, Julie Icaschmitter, on October 21,2005. Id. at 41-46, 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2719, successive state post-conviction proceedings are 
available where a claim is based on evidence reasonably discovered after the expiration of the 
forty-two day period bllowing the imposition of death. LC. 519-2719; see also. State v. 
Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960,969 (1 991). Under any circumstances, the eo~lviction and sentence of 
death imposed here is the result of a manifest injustice. Petitioner's claims raise significant 
allegations of a total collapse of the adversary system, denial of a fair trial and the probability that 
Petitioner is actually innocent of both the offenses charged and the death-eligibility determination 
made by Judge Reinhardt. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
Because the evidence here raises a substantial doubt as to Petitioner's guilt and wholly 
undermines the verdict of death, the claims must be heard. See, e.g., LC. $1 9-4901 (b); see also, 
Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,649,s P.3d 636,644 (2000).'2 The "actual innocence" of 
Petitioner permitts a successive post-conviction action to avoid a iniscarriage ofjustice. See, 
e.g., Idaho Code $19-4901(b); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho at 649, 8 P.3d at 644 (2000); see also, 
Sargent v. Henderson, 926 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 915 (1992), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds. 
'' Because a capital sentencing hearing is akin to a trial on guilt or innocence, the 
i~nposition of the death penalty is also akin to a verdict on the "guilt or innocence" of death 
penalty eligibility. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). 
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4. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 is Unconstitutional 
To the extent that the district court relied on Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) to summarily 
dismiss the clailns raise, Idaho Code 5 19-2719 is unconstitutional. 
a. Denial of the Manifest Injustice Exception Denies Petitioner 
Equal Protectio!~ and Due Process of Law 
If the court finds that I.C. 519-2719 precludes a manifest injustice exception to filing 
successive petitions, this Court must then find that the statute is unconstitutional in violation of 
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
~onstitutioh of the United States and Article 5 1 5 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the denial of procedural rights to similarly 
situated persons violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Baxtrorn v. tIevold, 383 U.S. 107, 108 (1966) [violation of equal protection not to pennit jury 
trial or judicial determination of mental illness for prison inmates as opposed to others being 
civilly committed]; and Jackson 1). Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972) (differential treatment for 
incompetent criminal defendants versus those civilly committed held in violation of equal 
protection). 
While this Court found a rational basis for the legislature's distinctive treatment of the 
two gxoups, that court did not analyze the drastic differential in the two statule of limitatiolls 
periods or the competency of post-conviction counsel as a basis for filing successive petitions. In 
essence, not only are capital defendants treated unequally, the extent of the disparate treatment is 
overwhelming. The statute violates both the equal protectio~l and due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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In Matheus v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19 (1976), the Supreme Court identified three general 
factors in the examination ofdue process: 
[Flirst, the pvivate interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedut-es used, and 
the probable value, if arty, of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Govermnent's interest, including the function ilivolved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pl-ocedural 
requiremerit would entail. 
Id. at  335. Here, the piivate interest is the greatest in our system ofjustice - the defendant's life. 
The risk of erroneous deprivation is geat because the defendant will be barred .forever from 
seeking relief from a sentence of death based on at least one type of claim - ineffective assistance 
of couiisel. Against this must be examined the legitimate interest of the state in limiting such 
petitions, which is non-existent in the case of prosecutorial misconduct. To apply this law only 
to capital defendants caught in the failed experiment of the legislative attempt to "rush to 
judgment" is the ultimate violation of the principles oE equal protection and due process 
This court must hear the Petition and deny the State's motion to dismiss. 
b. Idaho Code 519-2719 Is Unconstitutio~tally Vague Insofar as it 
Includes Inconsistent Standards of Waiver Without Ally 
Definition of What Constitutes Either "Reasonably St~ould 
Have Known" or "l<easonably Could Have Known" 
Idaho Code 5 19-2719(5) is unconstitutionally vague. First, the statute imposes an 
internally inconsiste~lt standard of "known" or "should reasonably have known," in subsection 
(5) versus a standard of reasonably "could" have been known in subsection (5)(a). LC. 3 19- 
25 15(5)(a). There is little question that "should" have known imposes a less stringent standard 
on a petitioner than "could have known." The ititernally inconsistent standards inalte application 
of the statute unconstitutior~aliy vague. 
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It is impossible to glean fi-om the statute or case law regarding the I.C. 519-2719 waiver 
standard exactly what "should reasonably have known" requires. Within the concept of 
"reasonably should have /mownn is a requivement of at least minimal understanding, and 
familiarity with claims subject to bar. 
Prosecutorial Misco~lduct claims are not the types of claims that are readily discoverable 
to the average lay persoti - they are generally affirmatively withheld and ar-e defined and 
identified only if the party raising the claim can energetically investigate and vigorously enforce 
discovery of the same 
c. Paz Improperly Grafts a "Reasonable Time" Requirement 
onto Idaho Code 519-2719 That Should Be Abandoned by this 
Court 
Idaho Code 519-2719 permits successive post-conviction proceedingsin death cases to be 
filed under celtain specified circumstances. The statute itself sets no time limit for these 
petitions. See I.C. 519-2719. However, as noted above, the Paz Court grafted a requirement 
onto the statute that iiewly discovered claims be filed within a "reasonable time." The addition 
of a time Limit was colitraly to the rules of statutory construction, violated the separation of 
powers doctrine, and rendered the statute uncollstitutiotlally vague. The Paz "reasonable time" 
requirement should be overruled. Petitioner acknowledges this argument has been recently 
rejected by this Court in Pizzuto v. State, - Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2008 WL 466568 *6 (2008). 
Petitioner respectfully incorporates herein the argument made in that case and urges 
reconsideration of the issue. See Brief of Appellant, 2006 WL 3520436 *19-20. 
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C. TIIE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS ASSERTED IXEREIN 
VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGKTS TO DUE PROCESS UNDER TLIE 
FIlrl'Il AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO TIIE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITlJTION AND COICIPARABLE RICEITS UNDER TIiE IDAI%O 
CONS'1'ITUTfON 
The cumulative effect of the constitutional errors in this case denied Mr. Pizzuto a fair 
trial. "Cumulative error applies where, although no single lrial enor examiued in isolation is 
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant revel-sal, the cumulative effect of ~nultiple errors has still 
prejudiced a defendant." Whelchel v Washir~gton. 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). The question is whether the aggregated errors " 'so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to ~nalce the resulling conviclion a denial of due process.' " 
Pavle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1045 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Donnelly v. I)eCizristoforo, 41 6 
U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. l868,40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). 
Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial and sentencing. Beyond the erroneous argument to 
the jury by the prosecutor regarding Rice's expectation of a far harsher penalty than was actually 
agreed upon, the snowball effect of the court's intervention and direction of the plea bargain 
impacted every facet ofthe guilt and innocence portion of the trials. Without the testimony of 
. .  . 
the co-defendants and the purportedly corroborating blood evidence, it is highly possible the jury 
would have acquitted Pizzuto of the first degree murder. More certainly, had this case been 
assigned to an impartial judge and had the events now known to have occulred not occurred, 
there is little reason to believe that Jerry Pizzuto, out of four possible killers, would have been 
singled out to die. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein the Orders of tile District Court su~nlnarily disinissing the 
petition fol- postconviction relief should be reversed and the Judgrnent of Conviction and Deatb 
Sentence entered in the case of S(nfe v. Gemld Ross Pizzuto. Jr.. Idaho Coulity Case No. Cli 85- 
22075, entered on May 27, 1986, be reversed and vacated, and new trial and sentencing 
collsistenl with the United States Constitution be held, or alternatively, this matter re~na~ided for 
appropriate discovery and an evidentiary hearing oil the issues raised herein and to pennit 
Petitioner to present his prior postconviction c1aims;including but not limited Lo ineffective 
assista~ce of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and the prohibitiol~ of execution as a result of 
his mental retardation, before a hir  and impartial judge. 
DATED this 19th day oEDecembe1-, 2008. 
Attortley for Petitioner 
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